SUre.~ac. Normally, the instruction process begins by decomposing the task environment into context-free features which the beginner can recognize without benefit of experience. The be- The highest level of performance, called mastery, comes during moments when the expert is totally absorbed in his work.
All conscious monitoring of his activities cease, and his
KV. responding in a masterful way in an emergency, is not conscious, until the emergency is over, of the gravity of the emergency .. nd the subtlety of his respozise.
III. THE PERCEPTRONICS MODEL OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES
We now describe the form that we believe the Perceptronics model would take if applied to Situation 2 emergencies with identifiable malfunctions but a complex pattern of situational detail. According to [3] , as experience accumulates, long-term memory comes to consist of numerous representational systems, each consisting of a meaningful cluster of related information.
Associated with those representations are templates which are preplanned responses which can only be activated when the pattern of environmental stimulae matches all the eiements in the representational system. Normally, relevant attributes of the environment are perceived through the perspective of the currently active representational system, and these attributes either confirm the appropriateness of the current representational system or the most salient attribute activates a different more appropriate representation. The difficulty, when emergencies of the type being considered here occur, is that the current perspective becomes inappropriate, and current attributes may be used to call up several alternative representations.
If they are so used, then integration of the information from these alternative perspectives becomes necessary. Since each perspective has its own associated preplanned response, no single appropriate response presents itself, culties should aZZ be considered along with distance.
-APerceptronics further recommends template integration, S i.e., some combining of the three conflicting decisions, each of which is the appropriate preplanned response to one interpretation of the objective situation.
(See "Situation 2, Cognitive Processes" entry in the Table on p. 7-37 of [3] .) What that would mean with respect to the above example is unclear. At other places in [3] integration of the representational systems, i.e., some combining of the facts seen as relevant in differing perspectives, is advocated.
(See [3] , p. 7-34 bottom and 7-35 top and discussion of Situation 2 i training on p. 7-36.) It is this recommendation that we shall treat in the next section.
IV. PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE PERCEPTRONICS MODEL
On the face of it, the Perceptronics model extended to cover situational attributes seems remarkably similar to our model of the fourth stage of skill acquisition--expertise [1] .
Both would start with the observation that a pilot in normal flight will be perceiving his situation through an appropriate perspective. When abruptly there is evidence that a specific malfunction has occurred, he must radically change this perspective. Attributes which were irrelevant to him before the malfunction, such as the terrain beneath him, the location of nearby air bases, etc., suddenly become important. Which of the vast number of potentially relevant environmental facts are seen as crucially important will determine which action he takes. The proficient performer is assumed to be seeing his situation throughi S? ' a broadly defined perspective so that the facts are already organized in such a way that each has its own degree of salience. As indicated above, the integration of perspectives The Necker cube illustrates the essential figure-background structure of perception pointed out by Merleau-Ponty [4] . This characteristic applies equally to all situational understanding, [5] .
Since an important part of our understanding of a situa.-"tion with which we are familiar is embodied in the relative degree of salience of the attributes, arbitrary equalizing of salience necessarily results in a loss of understanding.
The third drawback is that, since the pilot is hypothesized to be experionced, he must struggle to remain detached, constantly resisting his acquired tendency to view his situation from one of the already tested specific action-oriented perspectives flooding his mind. Faced with an emergency, the tension between the striving for detachment produced by training and the tendency to become involved produced by experience, could lead to a dangerous oscilla-
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tion between stances and hence responses.
The question remains: how can the pilot, while remaining involved in one perspective so as to avoid regression, make use 9 tof the information contained in other contrasting perspectives and yet avoid oscillation? (2) If several interpretations of the environmental attributes seem equally urgent, the pilot should be trained to arbitrarily and decisively choose one and proceed as in (1) above. From within the chosen perspective, the facts and the associated recovery plan will no longer appear ambiguous. This will avoid response oscillation.
The ability to stay involved thus taught enables the pilot both to act decisively and to remain responsive to new information.
It thus has all the advantages of responsiveness to the overall j situation which might seem to be gained from detachment, while avoiding the loss of understanding and the degradation of performance inherent in detached analysis.
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